INTRODUCTION
Large, complex organizations implement a range of policies and procedures to protect against risk. These both provide constraints and induce what we term organizational affordances. Organizational affordances allow for certain practices that lay the groundwork for procedural drift, or migration toward the boundaries of (explicitly mandated) safe operations over time (Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goldstein, 1994) . In many of today's organizations local practice drifts away from demands of global constraints. Such drift is usually in response to a combination of operational experiences and on-going pressures (e.g., budgets or schedules), and is potentially a major threat to safety in today's complex, socio-technical systems. This drift can be found at the core of both NASA shuttle accidents, and was given the name of normalization of deviance by Vaughn (1996) . This term captures the insight that practices and events once considered deviations (from procedures, expectations, or requirements) often become treated as normal over time.
Past and contemporary approaches to safety seek to eliminate the drift generated by local pressures through the use of tight control in the form of rules and procedures (Lintern, 2003) . But many complex systems are too large and complex to be accurately defined a priori. In this paper we conducted brief case studies of the Challenger and Columbia shuttle accidents, to explore and refine the procedural drift hypothesis and to develop methods for investigating it systematically. Focusing on the Columbia accident, we explored the applicability of two methods: knowledge map and system dynamics (SD) modeling.
METHOD
Knowledge map, initially described by Lintern (2003) is a theoretically-driven variant of WDA (Rasmussen et. al., 1994) . It enables the description of the environment in which the NASA shuttle program was operating without consideration of any given operator or position. Its utility derives from its ability to view the environment in which the organization operates to help determine when normal and abnormal situations occur. A key difference between knowledge map and WDA is that the former allows descriptions of tasks within its structure. While WDA is useful for constraints of a system, it cannot describe the organization or procedures that shift over time. A knowledge map is theoretically driven by a WDA, but includes procedural task analysis and organizational controls. A task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992 ) is a method that breaks down the mental and physical steps that the operator goes through. Fitting the procedural task analysis into this method enables visualization of how procedures are carried out.
Knowledge map supports navigation of a complex socio-technical system through (summarizing Lintern, 2003) :
• Functional clustering of information related to a single issue; • Representation of meaning at both higher and lower levels of detail; • Explicit representation of hidden interdependencies; and • Linking items between levels to reveal the means of achieving goals. A knowledge map analyzes the overarching goal of the system (i.e., shuttle operations), and breaks it into secondary goals according to individual organizationsdescribing collaborations, decisions, and management procedures. These are achieved through functional tasks, and these tasks are further broken down into sub-tasks to describe how the system, at its procedural level, acts within the global constraints of the organization. The lower levels describe models of functionality, reliability, and interdependence.
RESULTS: THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
The Columbia accident was the focus of our work. Information for this effort was primarily derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report issued in 2003. The Columbia accident occurred on February 1, 2003 upon re-entry, although the original physical cause for the accident occurred on January 16, 2003 during ascent. At 81.7 seconds after launch, one large and two smaller pieces of foam separated from the left bipod ramp and struck the wing's leading edge. Velocity at impact to the wing was approximately 220 m/s. Historical data had shown no other foam instances of this magnitude. Nevertheless, Mission Control decided that there was "no concern for [Reinforced Carbon-Carbon] or [Thermal Protection System] tile damage," and that there was "absolutely no concern for reentry." However, as we know, the orbiter's skin had been penetrated, exposing the underlying airframe to extreme temperatures, resulting in burn-through and the eventual disintegration of Columbia. Figure 1 illustrates a knowledge map for the Columbia accident. The task goals (highest level) describe system and global goals. These can be tangible or intangible, and are often difficult to measure. The shuttle program's goals during Columbia included: conducting innovative research, ensuring safety, staying on schedule, and working within a limited budget.
The overseeing agency (second level) describes the acting organizations with specific vested interest or control over tasks, goals, or the effects of the system. For Columbia, NASA as an organization was responsible for conducting innovative research. NASA was then decomposed into its managers and engineers. Managers maintained control of the shuttle schedule and budget, while engineers had control over safety. The United Space Alliance (USA), a contractor, was also responsible for safety while maximizing the utility of adherence to budget and schedule constraints.
The functional tasks (third level) describe specific goals of the organizations above. These goals need to be maximized or minimized for that organization's success. They often conflict among different organizations. NASA as a whole leads the way in scientific space exploration but also runs various other NASA programs that change over time (e.g., building the International Space Station). NASA managers and engineers assess risks of shuttle operations, contractors perform according to described obligations, and NASA programs like the U.S. Core Complete are carried out by NASA with input from the White House and Congress.
The purpose-related function (fourth level) describes higher-level tasks used to achieve the previously-described values and priorities. An example of a function is 'risk assessment,' characterized by the tasks of performing flight readiness and in-flight reviews. The remaining functional tasks are illustrated in Figure 1 .
The physical functions and effects (fifth level) describe specific tasks in detail, and can be viewed as a hierarchical task analysis. One task evaluated for Columbia was the flight readiness review. It was decomposed into composite tasks of comparing unknown anomalies to the engineering experience database; classifying problems into 'acceptable risk' prior to flight; addressing 'in-flight anomalies' from the last flight; reviewing the critical items list; and proving conditions were unsafe to fly. In-flight safety assessments included reviewing liftoff imagery by video and film cameras, then classifying anomalies as a "safety-of-flight risk" or not.
The physical properties (sixth level) describe the grouping of instances' descriptions represent both physical and intentional constraints within the system and its tasks. At this level, "foam insulation" is called out, and further instantiated at the final levels. Here we focused on the direct known cause of the Columbia accident; however, more could be included. The specific instance (seventh level) describes the physical proprieties that compose the upper levels of abstraction by describing specific instances or objects needed to achieve those tasks. These are specific to the local instance, rather than global.
System Dynamics Modeling
The SD model simulates the behaviors of procedural drift, illustrating how small deviations from procedures over time, coupled with continued experience of safe events, can incrementally (and unknowingly) lead to dangerous system states. Such a model can allow for the anticipation of risks and potential safety threats inherent to changes in organizational procedures. Within NASA, our model showed non-linear relationships between the major factors of interest; in particular, accumulating safe experience with foam strikes, which drives normalization of deviance (Vaughn, 1996) , combined with schedule pressures, moved the system into a high-risk condition. In that high-risk condition, environmental and stochastic factors produced a catastrophic accident. The numeric approach to simulating SD models provides approximations of non-linear equations, allowing for the examination of such complex behavior. To derive an effective solution, plausible explicit assumptions of linked factors are formed, thus providing reasonable means for examining initial behaviors. The utility of SD is that the precise values in any assumption do not have a significant effect on the basic relationships defined within the model.
The purpose of linking a SD model to the knowledge map is to represent the influence over time of the factors identified in the map on the overall safety level of the system (Figure 2) . Moreover, the model shows how factors can interact to create greater risk than when viewed in isolation. With the addition of each factor identified and its relations to others (Figure 3) , the "risk profile" over time changes significantly. If only design problems are considered, the risk changes very little. The addition of detection methods helps reduce risk, but when the influence of normalization of deviance (Vaughn, 1996) is included, the risk climbs slowly over time. Finally, including the influence of cost and schedule pressure helps to demonstrate how the system can be pushed into an unsafe region despite efforts to control risk. 
DISCUSSION
Prior to both shuttle accidents, the combined factors of normalization of deviance and schedule pressure pushed the boundaries of safety and left NASA operating in realms where unexpected circumstances could lead to catastrophe. In the Challenger case, repeated safe missions that showed o-ring blow-by on return led engineers and managers to discount its importance, lowering its risk classification over time. When Challenger was launched under extreme environmental conditions (low launch temperature), the potential risk of those conditions on o-ring integrity, and thus on mission safety, was not given sufficient weight. In the Columbia case, years of successful launches with foam shedding led to insufficient concern about the potential danger of the large amount of shedding observed soon after launch.
We represented a simplified version of these dynamics for Columbia in a knowledge map and an SD model. However, both accidents showed the same dynamics of normalization of deviance and procedural drift over time. We take this convergence as supporting evidence for the potential utility of the methods described.
Of course, our case studies were relatively narrow in scope and focused on modeling the accident dynamics identified in post hoc accident analyses (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Vaughn, 1996) . Nevertheless, we believe that they show promise, certainly as tools for systematic post hoc analysis and, potentially, even as predictive models for a priori risk identification.
